Venezuela Sets a 25-Year Framework for U.S. Oil Investment

Caracas is offering a long investment horizon and higher output, but the reported U.S. ownership structure remains disputed.

By Emilia Varga • • Markets

A long pipeline crosses a dark oilfield of pumpjacks toward a golden sunrise.

Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodríguez says a proposed US–Venezuela energy arrangement would run for 25 years and cover 17 existing oil fields plus eight undeveloped blocks. The plan aims to lift production above 1.5 million barrels a day and create a durable channel for foreign capital into an industry constrained by years of underinvestment, sanctions and operational decline.

Rodríguez estimated that the state could receive $209 billion over the life of the framework, assuming oil at $65 a barrel and roughly $19 of public revenue per barrel. Those figures are projections, not contracted cash flows. They depend on production targets being met, prices remaining supportive and investors receiving terms that justify the capital and political risk.

Venezuela currently produces about 1.25 million barrels a day, according to Reuters. Reaching the proposed target would therefore require an increase of at least 250,000 barrels a day, along with maintenance of current output from mature fields. That is achievable in physical terms but demanding in practice: pipelines, power supply, upgrading facilities and drilling programs all require sustained investment and reliable access to equipment.

Negotiations with Chevron are central because the US company already has operating experience and assets in Venezuela. A multi-decade framework could offer more stability than a sequence of short sanctions waivers, but its value depends on enforceable contracts and continuity across future governments in both countries.

A disputed ownership proposal

A separate report adds a more unusual dimension. The Wall Street Journal reported that the US government could receive a 35% passive interest in a Venezuelan oil venture associated with businessman Alejandro Betancourt, structured through penny warrants and accompanied by rights to buy as much as 20% of production at cost. Reuters relayed the report while noting a direct contradiction from a Pentagon spokesperson.

The spokesperson said the Office of Strategic Capital lacks legal authority to take equity stakes and can provide only loans, guarantees and other assistance. That conflict is material. Until an executed agreement, legal analysis or official filing resolves it, the proposed federal ownership should be treated as unconfirmed rather than as a completed transaction.

The difference is more than technical. Government credit support for a private investment fits within established industrial-policy tools. A direct US equity stake in foreign oil production would raise distinct questions about congressional authority, governance, sanctions, conflicts of interest and the allocation of commercial risk. Rights to purchase oil at cost would also need clear rules for pricing, quality, transport and resale.

Commercial and political constraints

Venezuela holds vast reserves, but reserves do not automatically become profitable production. Much of its crude is heavy and requires specialized processing. Infrastructure deterioration, skilled-worker losses and payment risk increase the cost of restoring output. Investors will also assess whether arbitration awards can be enforced and whether fiscal terms could change after capital has been committed.

For Washington, additional Venezuelan barrels could diversify supply and moderate energy prices. Yet a rapid policy reversal could undermine the credibility of sanctions as a negotiating tool. Any durable arrangement therefore needs explicit conditions covering transparency, revenue flows, environmental liabilities and the treatment of existing creditors.

For Caracas, long-term US investment could unlock technology and export access. It could also create political exposure if opponents frame the terms as surrendering control over national resources. Rodríguez’s revenue estimate is meant to show the public benefit, but the underlying assumptions and contract allocation have not been published in sufficient detail for independent verification.

Oil markets should avoid treating the headline target as immediate supply. Field rehabilitation and greenfield development take time. Even if the framework is finalized, the production response would likely arrive in stages and remain vulnerable to financing, equipment and policy delays.

Why it matters

The proposal could reshape both Venezuela’s economy and US energy diplomacy. A credible 25-year structure would be a break from temporary waivers and ad hoc negotiations, giving companies a longer horizon for investments that cannot be recovered quickly. It could also bring a meaningful volume of heavy crude back into international supply chains.

But credibility is the scarce asset. The production and revenue targets come from the Venezuelan government, while the reported US equity arrangement is disputed by the agency said to be involved. Investors, creditors and refiners should distinguish the broad political intention from bankable project terms.

The next evidence to watch is concrete: signed field agreements, disclosed investment commitments, licensing rules, the legal basis for any US government participation and a timetable for the first production increments. Until those pieces appear, the framework is strategically significant but commercially provisional.

Sources